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Apportioning Liability to Nonparties
in Kentucky Tort Actions:
A Natural Extension of Comparative
Fault or a Phantom Scapegoat
for Negligent Defendants?
INTRODUCTION
In Walt Disney World v. Wood,' a frequently noted and highly publi-
cized decision, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's
joint judgment against Walt Disney World for eighty-six percent of the
total damages, even though the jury had only apportioned one percent of
fault to the company. The plaintiff in that case was injured when a
bumper car driven by her fianc6 struck the bumper car that she was
driving.2 At trial, the jury apportioned fourteen percent of the fault to the
plaintiff, eighty-five percent of the fault to the fianc6, and only one
percent of the fault to Walt Disney World? However, since the plaintiff
did not join the fianc6 as a defendant to the action, the court issued a
judgment against the corporate defendant for eighty-six percent of the
damages under the doctrine of joint and several liability.4 This case
illustrates the inequity that has caused some states to abandon the
judicially created doctrine of joint and several liability in favor of a
system which apportions liability among multiple tortfeasors according to
their equitable share of fault.5
Joint and several liability is a judicially created doctrine6 in which
each defendant is liable for the entire amount of a plaintiff's damages, no
matter how minimal his contribution to the accident. Therefore, the
' 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).2 Id. at 199.
3Id.
4Id.
s In fact, the Wood case "arose before the adoption of FLA. STAT. ANN. 768.81 ...
which severely limits the doctrine of joint and several liability. The statute would dictate
a different result." HENRY WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 13:4,
at 80-81 (Supp. 1991).
6 Wood, 515 So. 2d at 200.
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plaintiff can recover all of his damages from any defendant.7 The
doctrine is based on the theory that has been used to rationalize the
doctrine of contributory negligence-that an injury caused by joint
tortfeasors is indivisible! The indivisible injury theory rests on the
premise that it is impossible to divide liability or damages for a single
injury, such as death or a broken arm, that has been created by more than
one causative force.9 Because the injury cannot be divided, each
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages. ° In most states,
however, paying defendants are entitled to contribution from other
tortfeasors on a pro rata basis (each tortfeasor pays an equal amount no
matter how minimal his contribution to the damages).,
The shift away from joint and several liability is often viewed as a
natural extension of the principles that supported the countrywide
adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence." In the past two
decades, a substantial majority of states have abandoned the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence, which acts as an absolute bar to the
plaintiff's recovery in negligence actions, and have replaced it with the
more equitable doctrine of comparative negligence, which apportions
damages between the plaintiff and defendant according to each party's
relative degree of fault. 3 In moving away from a contributory negli-
gence scheme to a fault-based comparative negligence system, courts and
legislatures across the country have struggled to justify other common
law or statutory doctrines, such as joint and several liability, that evolved
as part of a contributory negligence system. 4 Changes in some of these
long-standing doctrines were inevitable, however, if a fault-based system
were to survive. Although some states have remained reluctant to alter
common law principles,15 many of which have been embedded in our
7 WOODS, supra note 5, at 225.
8 W. PAGE KEErON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65,
at 452-53 (5th ed. 1984).
9Id.
10 Id.
" Id. § 50 at 338, 340.
12 See Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988) (holding that
in order to be consistent with comparative' negligence principles, fault must be
apportioned to those settling with the plaintiff before trial, even if the plaintiff did not file
a formal claim against them).
13 KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 471-72.
14 See, e.g., id. at 475-79 (discussing the effect of comparative negligence on joint
and several liability and other tort doctrines).
15 Id. at 475. Other doctrines at risk include the last clear chance doctrine and the
assumption of the risk defense. Id. at 477.
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country's tort system for the past century, other states have recognized
and responded to the need to revise doctrines such as joint and several
liability in order to avoid troublesome results like that reached in the
Woods case. 6
The general policy justification behind a move to a fault-based system
for allocating damages between a plaintiff and defendant is that each
party's liability should be limited to the extent of his fault rather than a
plaintiff's recovery and a defendant's liability being an all-or-nothing
situation.'7 This policy raises questions about the need for a similar
allocation of damages among multiple defendants. Although most states
retained the judicially created doctrine of joint and several liability
following the move to comparative negligence," many of these states'
legislatures or judiciaries have eventually abrogated or limited joint and
several liability in favor of an apportionment scheme. 9 However, the
abandonment ofjoint and several liability itself raises questions about the
fate of other long-standing common law and statutory doctrines such as
contribution, indemnity, and the traditional application of workers'
16 Id. at 475-79.
17 Id. at 468-70.
' WOODS, supra note 5, at 225 (1978).
I91d. For example, Vermont's comparative fault statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1036 (1979), partially abandons joint and several liability by providing that each tortfeasor
is liable only for the relative share of damage that he caused, compared to the damage
caused by the other liable defendants. New Hampshire and Nevada have similar statutes.
Two additional states, Texas and Oregon, have statutorily limited joint and several
liability when the plaintiff is more causally at fault than the defendant(s). WOODS, supra
note 5, at 225-26; Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 201 n.4 (Fla. 1987).
A similar Florida statute has also recently been interpreted as having been "enacted
to replace joint and several liability with a system that requires each party to pay for
noneconomic damages only in proportion to the percentage of fault by which that
defendant contributed to the accident." Fabre v. Martin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla.
1993). Joint and several liability remains in force in certain limited situations, such as for
economic damages when the plaintiff's negligence is less than that of the defendant. Id.
at 1184, 1186 n.l.
In addition, according to Wood, 515 So. 2d at 200-01, the following states have
completely eliminated the common law doctrine of joint and several liability: Kansas, in
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-258a(d) (1976)); New Mexico, in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646
P.2d 579, 586 (N.M. Ct. -App.), cert. denied, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982) (ruling that
because New Mexico was a pure comparative negligence state, a defendant should not be
held liable for the negligence of an unknown driver); and Oklahoma, in Paul v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980) ("To limit the jury to viewing the negligence
of only one tortfeasor and then ask it to apportion that negligence to the overall wrong
is to ask it to judge a forest by observing just one tree.").
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compensation law. Therefore, the states that have taken a step away from
joint and several liability have encountered the difficult choice of either
incorporating these long-standing doctrines into the fault-based scheme or
eliminating them completely.
Although judiciaries adopting the comparative negligence doctrine
generally anticipated and discussed some of the impending problems more
thoroughly than the legislatures, they did not foresee or provide for all of the
problems and intricacies that have emerged.20 Kentucky is no exception. The
Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the comparative negligence system
relatively late2 and, therefore, had the benefit of hindsight in dealing with
difficulties faced by other jurisdictions. Since its adoption of the doctrine, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has consistently taken a proactive stance in its
decisions, trying to anticipate and prevent many of the problems that have
produced litigation in other jurisdictions' Nevertheless, Kentucky has
encountered a considerable amount of difficulty in applying the comparative
negligence doctrine to situations involving multiple tortfeasors.
Considering the initial reluctance of the Kentucky Supreme Court and
General Assembly to adopt comparative negligence, Kentucky has since
taken a rather aggressive stance in extending the reaches of the doctrine by
providing for the apportionment of fault among multiple tortfeasors, some of
whom are not present at trial. In fact, some members of the court have
emphatically asserted that Kentucky has gone too far.24 Ironically, part of
20 MARK A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATnVES 389 (5th ed. 1992). See generally WiLuAM L. PROSSER Er AL.,
CASES AND MATERALS ON TORTS 582-84 (8th ed. 1988) (discussing the problems with
the implementation of comparative negligence).
21 The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence in Hilen v. Hays,
673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984).
' See, e.g., Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 431-32 (Ky. 1988)
(holding that fault must be apportioned to settling parties, even if they never had a formal
claim asserted against them); Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d
24, 29 (Ky. 1990) (approving apportionment of fault to a third-party defendant employer);
Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817, 820-21 (Ky. 1990) (holding that when a jury
apportions no fault to a settling party, the remaining defendant is not entitled to a credit
for the amount paid by the settler, but must pay according to the percentage that the jury
found the defendant to be at fault).
In his separate opinions in the above cases, Justice Leibson vigorously criticized the
court's proactive confrontation of issues not before it. See Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 433-36
(Leibson, J., dissenting); Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 31-37 (Leibson, J., dissenting); Stratton, 793
S.W.2d at 821-23 (Leibson, J., concurring).
' See Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 715-17. Kentucky was the forty-second state to adopt
comparative negligence. Id.
' In a line of Kentucky Supreme Court cases involving apportionment of fault
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what has prompted Kentucky to be so aggressive in its extension of
comparative fault principles to multiple tortfeasor situations is that the
state had actually been apportioning fault among multiple defendants in
limited situations long before its adoption of comparative negligence.
Kentucky first began to depart from the common law doctrine of joint
and several liability as early as the late 1800s when it enacted section
454.040 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS"), which provides that
the jury in a trespass action may, in its sole discretion, assess several
damages
In 1988, the Kentucky General Assembly passed a statute,26 modeled
after portions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,27 that provides for
the allocation of fault in tort actions. Although the statute deals
directly with some of the problems previously raised, many questions and
controversies remain, particularly in the area of apportioning fault to
"nonparties." This Note surveys the present status of Kentucky law
involving apportionment of fault to multiple tortfeasors and discusses and
evaluates some of the controversies regarding the soundness of the law
as it currently stands.
Part I of this Note focuses on the policies behind the widespread
adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine in courts and legislatures
across the country.' Part II discusses the Kentucky legislative and
judicial evolution of the doctrine of apportioning fault among tortfeasors
prior to the state's adoption of comparative negligence."0 The Note then
analyzes some Kentucky decisions following the adoption of comparative
negligence that involve the extension of the comparative fault policy to
multiple tortfeasor situations where fault is apportioned to "nonparties,"
particularly settling tortfeasors and parties who are immune, unnamed,
unreachable, or have been dismissed before or during trial." Particular
attention is paid to the ongoing debate between members of the Kentucky
Supreme Court concerning the viability of these decisions and the
among multiple tortfeasors, some of whom are not present at trial, there has been an
ongoing debate between Justice Vance and Justice Leibson regarding the soundness of the
policies behind many of the court's decisions.
u KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.040 (Baldwin 1993); Stratton, 793 S.W.2d at 818-20
(providing a historical description of the development of joint and several liability and
apportionment law in Kentucky).
2' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Baldwin 1993).
27 UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
2 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Baldwin 1993).
z' See infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 69-104 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 105-85 and accompanying text.
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competing interests involved. The final section discusses the 1988
Kentucky Apportionment of Liability Statute32 and its allocation of fault
in tort actions, the Kentucky Supreme Court's response, and some
questions involving the current state of the law.3
I. TUE COUNTRYWIDE STAMPEDE TOWARD
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The contributory negligence doctrine was first introduced into
American common law as a defense in tort actions in 1824.3 Eventual-
ly, every American state adopted the doctrine and developed a body of
common law based on a contributory negligence system. Under this
system, when the defendant in a tort action raises contributory negligence
as a defense, a plaintiff's recovery is completely barred if his own
negligence in any way contributed to the accident. Similarly, under
Kentucky's contributory negligence doctrine, which was judicially adopted
in 1892, a plaintiff who had contributed to his injury to the extent that the
accident would not have happened "but for" his negligence would not be
able to recover from the defendant.36
Although comparative negligence first appeared in American jurispru-
dence in the early twentieth century,3 the inherently inequitable doctrine
of contributory negligence remained the prevalent rule in American states
until around 1970.3' By the mid-1960s, only seven states had switched
to comparative negligence. 9 With the 1970s, however, came a stampede
of states abandoning contributory negligence in favor of a more equitable
system of comparative fault. By 1982, forty states had followed the
trend." As of 1991, forty-four states had adopted some form of compar-
32 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Baldwin 1993).
33 See infra notes 186-309 and accompanying text.
34 According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the first American case to allow the
defense of contributory negligence was Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky. 1984).
35 KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 65, at 451-52.
36 Newport News & M.V.R. Co. v. Dauser, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 734 (1892), was the
"first Kentucky case on record to apply this principle." Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 714-15.
37 KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 471. State legislation involving railways and
federal laws involving safety and employment were among the first to include allowances
for damage apportionment. Id.
38 Id.
3 Id. Among the pioneers were Mississippi, Georgia, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
South Dakota, Arkansas, and Maine. Id. at 471 n.26.
40 Id. at 471.
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ative negligence, ten by judicial decision and thirty-four by legislative
action.4'
The primary criticism of contributory negligence is that its all-or-
nothing approach to recovery provides a windfall for either the plaintiff
or the defendant 2 Therefore, the general policy behind most states'
move to a comparative negligence scheme is that the cost of the accident
should not always be borne completely by the plaintiff or completely by
the defendant. Rather, the liability for any particular injury should be
assessed in direct proportion to fault 3 However, this seemingly
straightforward policy might have underlying dual justifications of
apportioning liability according to fault and ensuring recovery of injured
plaintiffs which become antagonistic when the policy is extended to a
multiple defendant situation.
The basic idea behind the comparative negligence doctrine is that in
a system which bases liability upon fault, the extent of that fault should
govern the extent of liability." If this justification is sound, it should
arguably be extended to multiple tortfeasor situations in order to protect
defendants from paying more than their equitable share of damages."
However, increasing the likelihood that persons injured by negligent
defendants4' will be flly compensated might also be an underlying
motive for switching to a comparative negligence scheme. Instead of
supporting apportionment of liability to joint tortfeasors, this latter
justification would require the retention of joint and several liability.47
In 1984, Kentucky became one of the last states to adopt a comparative
fault system, in which the plaintiff's recovery in a negligence action is
reduced in direct proportion to his fault. In Hilen v. Hays49 the Kentucky
41 PROSSER Er AL., supra note 20, at 576. The states that have adopted
comparative negligence by judicial decision are Kentucky, California, Alaska,
Michigan, Missouri, West Virginia, New Mexico, Illinois, Iowa and Florida. Id. at
570, 576. See generally FRANKIaN & RABN, supra note 20, at 388-89 (discussing
the move toward comparative negligence in the United States).
42 See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717-19 (Ky. 1984) (adopting comparative
negligence on the premise that liability should be limited to the extent of a party's fault).
43 See id. at 718.
"See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Cal. 1975) (adopting
comparative negligence in California and providing an extensive analysis of the doctrine).
41 John M. Rogers, Apportionment in Kentucky After Comparative Negligence, 75
KY. L.J. 103, 111-12 (1986-87).
4id.
4 Id.
4' Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
49 Id.
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Supreme Court acknowledged the inequities of an all-or-nothing contributory
negligence system wherein any negligence on the part of the plaintiff
completely bars his recovery.50 While recognizing the tendency of many
other state courts to defer to the legislature, Justice Leibson, writing for the
majority, justified the judicial implementation of the new doctrine of
comparative negligence on the theory that since contributory negligence was
a judicially created doctrine, it was the court's responsibility to abandon it.5'
Despite the fact that all of the Kentucky Supreme Court justices in Hilen
agreed on the principles that support a comparative negligence approach, 2
the court has been consistently split in recent decisions involving apportion-
ment of liability among tortfeasors. Different underlying motivations of the
individual justices might help to explain this split. Justice Leibson, writing for
the majority in Hilen v. Hays, quoted Prosser injustifying the court's adoption
of comparative negligence:
"The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the
obvious injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of
two parties on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least
able to bear it, and quite possible much less at fault than the defendant who
goes scot-free. No one has ever succeeded injustifying that as a policy, and
no one ever will!" 3
The above quotation seems to emphasize fairness to the plaintiff as a
justification, thus supporting the retention of joint and several liability. Later
in the opinion, though, Justice Leibson stated that "[c]omparafive negligence
.... calls for liability for any particular injury in direct proportion to
fault."' 4 This statement seems to support apportionment of damages among
joint tortfeasors. However, Leibson consistently dissented in subsequent cases
in which a majority of the court extended apportionment of liability to joint
tortfeasors, some of whom were not present at trial, viewing it as a "natural
extension" of the policies expressed in Hilen v. Hays.55
'0 Id. at 717-19.
"Id. at 715-17.
'z Id. at 718-19 (Leibson, L, majority); id. at 722 (Vance, J., dissenting) ("It seems
just to me that in a system in which liability is based upon fault, the extent of the fault
should govern the extent of the liability.").
's Id. at 717 (quoting William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv.
465, 469 (1953)).
'4Id. at 718.
" See, e.g., Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 433-36 (Ky. 1988)
(Leibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that fault should not be apportioned to parties from
[Vol. 82
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The extent to which the move to comparative negligence will affect tort
law generally differs from state to state, depending on which form of
comparative negligence the particular state adopts. There are basically three
types of comparative negligence: pure, modified and slight/gross. 6 In a pure
comparative negligence system, a plaintiff's negligence in no way bars
recovery, but serves to reduce his damages in proportion to his fault. The
plaintiff recovers from a defendant even if the plaintiff himself was ninety-
nine percent at fault57 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act," which is
widely endorsed by commentators, adopts pure comparative negligence 9
Fourteen states have opted for a pure system, including nine out of the ten
states that have adopted comparative negligence through judicial decision.'
The Kentucky Supreme Court followed the trend set by other judiciaries in
opting for a pure comparative fault system.6'
In a modified comparative negligence system, the plaintiff's contributory
negligence does not prevent recovery unless it rises above a certain amount
of the total fault.' Two slight variations of the modified system exist, an
"equal fault bar" approach and a "greater fault bar" approach. Under the
"equal fiult bar" approach, a plaintiff cannot recover if his fault is greater
than or equal to the defendant fault. Under the "greater fault bar" approach,
a plaintiff is prevented from recovering only if his fault is greater than that
of the defendant. This approach has been sharply criticized because of the
likelihood that a jury will apportion equal fault in a close case. Most state
whom the plaintiff accepted a nominal settlement); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696
S.W.2d 503, 506-10 (Ky. 1985) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that fault should not be
apportioned to a party against whom the claim was dismissed because the statute of
limitations barred the claim against him).
'6 KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 471.
17 Id. at 471-72.
"' UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT ACT, 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981). This Act was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
Act has not yet been adopted in full by any state, but portions of the Act have served as
models for state legislation and judicial decisions. Iowa and Washington, in particular,
have adopted substantial portions of the Act. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 1986).
-9 KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 472.
61 Id. at 471-72 & nma. 28, 31. West Virginia is the only state that has judicially
adopted a modified comparative negligence scheme. Id. at 472 & n.32 (citing to Bradly
v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979)).
", Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984) (discussing pure and modified
forms and ultimately selecting the pure form).
62 KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 473.
6Id.
64Id.
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legislatures that have adopted comparative negligence have chosen one of the
two modified versions.65 Two states have rejected the pure form as well as
the variations of the modified form, however, and have instead opted for the
slight/gross approach, wherein the plaintiff may recover only if his negligence
is slight in comparison to the that of the defendant."
$ The move to comparative negligence was inevitably accompanied by
a host of unanticipated implementation difficulties that have produced
endless litigation in courtrooms across the country.' The application of
comparative negligence remains relatively straightforward in actions
involving one plaintiff and one defendant. However, the difficulties in
applying the comparative fault doctrine in actions where multiple parties
are involved have necessitated a re-examination of some long-standing
common law doctrines that are grounded in a contributory negligence
regime. One major issue confronted by courts and legislatures is whether
fault should be apportioned only to plaintiffs and defendants to an action,
or also to third-party defendants and tortfeasors who are not present at
trial, such as settling, unreachable, or immune tortfeasors."
I. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF
APPORTIONMENT iN KENTucK Y
A. The State of the Law Prior to the Adoption of Comparative
Negligence
The first Kentucky Supreme Court decision dealing with the
apportionment of liability to "defendants" who are no longer present at
6s FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 20, at 389. The various rules regarding the
comparative negligence systems adopted by legislative bodies have been explained as "the
result of compromise between conflicting interests in the legislatures, and [as] smack[ing]
of political expediency rather than of any reason or logic in the situation." WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 437 (4th ed. 1971).
KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 474. The two states that have adopted the
slight/gross approach are Nevada and South Dakota. Id. See generally FRANKLIN &
RABIN, supra note 20, at 388 (explaining the various systems); PROSSER zr AL., supra
note 20, at 577-79 (discussing the various approaches and providing examples of each).
KEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 477-79 (discussing the effect of comparative
negligence on other doctrines).
' FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 20, at 389, 395-98. States adopting a modified
version of comparative negligence also must determine whether the plaintiff's negligence
should be compared against each defendant or against all defendants combined. Id. at 397.
This Note does not address that issue since Kentucky has adopted a pure comparative
negligence system.
[Vol. 82
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trial was Orr v. Coleman.69 In Orr, a passenger in an automobile
accident sued the driver of the car in which she was riding, the owner of
the car in which she was riding, and the driver of the other car involved
in the accident." The plaintiff settled with the driver and owner of the
car in which she was riding. At trial, the jury, pursuant to an instruction
informing it of the $19,000 settlement and directing it to award an
amount equal to the difference between the total damages and the amount
of the settlement,7 awarded $22,000 against the remaining defendant.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the prior
settlement nor its amount should have been disclosed to the jury, and that
the jury should have been required to apportion fault to the settling
tortfeasors.72
The Supreme Court's decision in Orr was based not on comparative
fault principles,73 but on an old Kentucky statute74 that allowed juries
the discretion either to apportion fault among joint defendants to an
action or to impose joint damages.75 If a jury decided to apportion under
the statute, no right to contribution among defendants existed; each
defendant just paid the percentage of total damages equal to his propor-
tionate share of fault. The underlying policy behind the statute was that
the damages should be apportioned among the joint tortfeasors according
to their relative culpability even though the tortfeasors' liability to the
plaintiff is joint and several.7 Until Orr, the statute's reach was relative-
ly narrow because, when read literally, it only extended to joint defen-
dants who were still present at trial when the verdict was rendered.'
The significance of the previously narrow reading of the statute was that
the plaintiff's recovery was in no way affected by an apportionment of
fault.
9 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
70 Id. at 60.
"' Id. It was unclear whether the damage figure set by the jury represented the
plaintiff's total damages or damages after the subtraction of the settlement amount.
However, the court did not have to reach that question in light of its decision that
damages should have been apportioned. Id.
7 Id. at 61-62.
' The decision in Orr was rendered fifteen years prior to the Kentucky Supreme
Court's adoption of comparative negligence in 1984.
74 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.040 (Baldwin 1993).
75 Id.; KEErON ET AL., supra note 8, § 52, at 347 & n.25; Rogers, supra note 45, at
105.
76 Orr, 455 S.W.2d at 61.
' This assumption is based on a literal reading of"defendants" as used in the statute.
Rogers, supra note 45, at 105-06.
1993-941
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In Orr, the court interpreted the statute more broadly so as to include
situations involving a settling defendant. The Orr court held that in such
a situation, apportionment would no longer be discretionary as provided
for under the statute, but mandatory.78 The rationale was that when a
settling tortfeasor is no longer before the court, the remaining defendant
has no chance of the jury choosing to apportion under the statute.79
Without apportionment, a judgment for the entire amount of damages is
rendered against the remaining defendant, with a credit being given for
amounts paid by the other party in settlement. Hence, if apportionment
were not required, the defendant would pay the difference between the
damages and the amount of the settlement and would therefore bear the
burden of shouldering low settlements."
Allowing the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability to depend upon the
amount of a settlement over which he has no control does not accomplish
the statute's underlying policy of limiting a defendant's liability to an
amount in proportion to his share of culpability.8' If this problem were
solved by first assessing all of the damages to the remaining defendant
and then allowing contribution from the settling tortfeasor, settlements
would be discouraged.' Therefore, the court reasoned that the solution
was to require apportionment among the parties who had bought their
peace before trial, on the arbitrary assumption that the jury would have
exercised their discretion to apportion under the statute if the settler had
gone to trial. 3 Thus, after Orr, no matter what amount the settling party
had paid the plaintiff, the plaintiffs recovery from the remaining
defendant(s) would be reduced by the percentage of fault that the jury
allocated to the settling party.
Although the court decided Orr long before it adopted comparative
negligence, the policy behind its application of KRS section 454.040
indicates an underlying concern for fairness to defendants and a tendency
toward a system of apportioning liability based on fault as well as a
desire to encourage settlement. Orr was the first step on a long path taken
by the Kentucky court system toward accomplishing those objectives.
Orr, 455 S.W.2d at 61.
Id.; Rogers, supra note 45, at 105-06.
'0 Orr, 455 S.W.2d at 61. The defendant bears this burden because without
apportionment, the defendant will, pay the difference between the damages and the
settlement. In other words, the defendant only receives a credit for the amount paid by
the settling defendant.
8t Id.
SId.; Rogers, supra note 45, at 106-07.
3 On, 455 S.W.2d at 61; Rogers, supra note 45, at 106.
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Thus, when the court adopted comparative negligence several years later,
it noted that Orr and KRS section 454.040 seem to favor a policy of
apportioning liability according to fault."
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Nix v. Jordan85 refused to extend
apportionment to third-party defendants who, because they shared some
close relationship to the plaintiff, were not originally joined as defen-
dants, but whom the defendant brought into the action seeking contribu-
tion or indemnity.86 Although the court expressed a belief that it "might
otherwise make good sense to apply the principle of apportionment
among joint tortfeasors without exception,"" it declined to extend
apportionment to third-party defendants for two reasons. First, the court
explained that third-party defendants do not fit under the literal wording
of KRS section 454.040 because it applies only to "defendants" to an
action.88 The court refused to read the statute so liberally as to include
third-party defendants and instead confined application of the statute to
joint defendants, or defendants "as to the original plaintiff."" Second,
the court recognized that the Orr policy of encouraging settlement would
not be furthered in this situation, because the plaintiff did not have any
intention of asserting a claim against the third-party defendant."
Therefore, after Nix, joint and several liability with the possibility of
contribution continued in third-party claims against one who had not been
joined by the plaintiff."
After Orr and Nix, the jury could apportion liability between
defendants in two situations. In the first situation, KRS section 454.040
gave the jury the option of either apportioning liability or issuing a joint
judgment against defendants who remained present at trial.92 In the
second situation, Orr required that the jury apportion fault to any of the
named defendants who settled before trial.93 A few years later, the court
extended the Orr doctrine to require apportionment to defendants who had
'4Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Ky. 1984).
"532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975), overrded by Dix &Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc.
v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
'4Id. at 762-63. The third-party defendant in Nix was the plaintiff's husband, which
may explain why she did not name him as an original defendant.
'71d. at 763.
"Id.
"Id. The court also distinguished Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
"Nix, 532 S.W.2d at 763; Rogers, supra note 45, at 108.
"Rogers, supra note 45, at 107 ("In cases such as Nix where there is no apportion-
ment, contribution is permitted.").
9KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.040 (Baldwin 1993).
"Orr, 455 S.W.2d at 59.
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the claims against them dropped prior to submission to the jury, "whatever
may have been the reason." In Daulton v. Reed, the plaintiff sued two
defendants, but dropped the claim against one prior to submission to the
jury.95 The jury found total damages of $8,568.75 and apportioned seventy-
five percent of the damages to the remaining defendant and twenty-five
percent to the dismissed defendant?6 However, since the latter was no
longer present, the trial court entered the whole judgment against the
remaining defendant and gave him a judgment for contribution against the
dismissed defendant for twenty-five percent of the damages
7
The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the trial court's decision in
Daulton based on the principles asserted in Orr." The court noted that Orr
"applies when there has been an active assertion of a claim against one who
would be a defendant but for the fact that he had settled the claim."99 The
court held that the same line of reasoning supports the application of Orr
when the claim against the defendant has been dismissed, "whatever may
have been the reason.""'' In analogizing this situation to a settlement, the
court seems to have based its decision on the assumption that the plaintiff in
some way facilitated the dismissal of the claim.'' However, the court's
statement that fault must be apportioned when a claim is dropped "no matter
what may have been the reason" could be construed to include dismissal of
claims by the trial court for reasons unrelated to the plaintiff's actions." In
a later case, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained the application of
apportionment: "A tortfeasor who is not actually a defendant is construed to
be one for purposes of apportionment if he has settled the claim against him
[Orr] or if he was named as a defendant in the plaintiff's complaint even
though the complaint was subsequently dismissed as to him [Daulton]"'
Daulton v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1976).
I d. at 307.
9 Id. at 308.
97 Id.
9Id.
sId.
100 Id.
101 Rogers, supra note 45, at 108 ("It may be, then, that the Daulton Court reasoned
that there must have been some sort of quid pro quo without which the claim would not
have been dismissed.").
" The former interpretation is more consistent with the Orr policy of protecting the
incentive to settle in order to decrease the number of cases that must be resolved through
the courts. Id. This point becomes important in analyzing more recent decisions which are
based on the principles asserted in Orr and Daulton.
103 Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988).
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Thereafter, the state of the apportionment law in Kentucky remained
unchanged until the adoption of comparative negligence in 1984.'"
B. Kentucky Apportionment Decisions After the Adoption of
Comparative Negligence
Although the status of Kentucky's apportionment law did not change
significantly in the first few years following the state's adoption of
comparative negligence, a case decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court
in 1985 ' started an ongoing debate between members of the court
concerning the apportionment of liability to parties in multiple tortfeasor
situations, particularly those in which one or more participants in the
accident were not joined or were no longer parties to the action. In
Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Moody,' the jury apportioned liability
between two defendants, pursuant to KRS section 454.040. The Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed as to one defendant because the statute of
limitations had rum. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's
motion for a judgment against the remaining defendant for the entire
amount." 7 The court of appeals reversed and entered a judgment for the
entire amount of damages against the remaining defendant, reasoning that
if the trial court had originally dismissed the claim against the other
defendant, the jury would not have apportioned. Therefore, a joint
judgment would have originally been rendered against the remaining
defendant.' 8
104 John M. Rogers, Apportionment in Kentucky After Comparative Fault, supra note
45, provides a critical analysis of Kentucky's apportionment law. One major criticism of
Kentucky's approach is that it seems illogical to allow apportionment (based on the theory
that apportionment among joint tortfeasors should be allocated according to fault) when
either the jury decides to apportion under KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.040 (Baldwin
1993), or the plaintiff has entered into a partial settlement and, yet, not to allow it when
the plaintiff for whatever reason decides not to assert a claim against a particular
tortfeasor. In addition, Nix allows a plaintiff to sidestep the consequences of apportion-
ment by simply not asserting a claim against, and not settling with, a certain defendant
who either happens to be a friend or relative or has insufficient financial resources. This
criticism led to the eventual overruling of Nix "[t]o the extent that it prohibits apportion-
ment of liability in tort actions between an original defendant and defendants brought into
the litigation as third-party defendants." Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key,
799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
15 Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985).
1o6 Id.
'07 Id. at 504.
log Id.
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Upon discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, based on a broad reading of KRS section 454.040 and
Daulton v. Reed,"9 and held that the jury properly apportioned fault to the
dismissed defendant."' The holding in Prudential Life significantly broad-
ens the Daulton holding. In Daulton, the court analogized the dismissal of
the claim to a quid pro quo settlement, thus justifying its decision by the fact
that the plaintiff had in some way facilitated the dismissal of the claim in
return for some form of compensation."' Therefore, the Daulton court was
merely extending the reasoning of the Orr court,"' with an eye toward
encouraging settlement and eliminating unnecessary litigation.
Rather than focusing on Daulton's general policy of encouraging
settlement, the Prudential Life court focused on the portion of the Daulton
decision that stated that fault should be apportioned to a party against whom
a claim had previously been dropped, "whatever may have been the
reason.""' The result is that, under Prudential Life, fault is apportioned to
parties from whom the plaintiffhas not received, and cannot possibly receive,
any compensation. The plaintiff's recovery is diminished by the amount of
fault apportioned to the dismissed defendant.
Prudential Life is distinguishable from Daulton because the plaintiff in
Prudential Life did not drop the claim against the defendant and received
nothing as a result of the dismissal. Therefore, the policy of encouraging
settlements, which was relied upon in Daulton, was inapplicable to the facts
of Prudential Life."4 That discrepancy might have been the force behind
Justice Vance's concurring opinion in Prudential Life, which rested explicitly
on the general "fault" rational."5 Justice Vance asserted that the result
reached by the majority was justified because of the principle asserted in
Hilen v. Hays'6: no party should be held liable for more of the damages
than the percentage caused by his fault."7
Not surprisingly, Justice Leibson issued a dissenting opinion 8 in
Prudential Life in which he attacked KRS section 454.040"' and the
109 538 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1976). For a description of the case, see supra notes 95-103
and accompanying text.
"0 Prudentia/Lif, 696 S.W.2d at 504.
. Daulton, 538 S.W.2d at 308.
112 Id.
113 Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 504.
114 Rogers, supra note 45, at 117.
... Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 504 (Vance, J., concurring).
116 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
117 Id. at 717.
" Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 506 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 507.
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Kentucky Supreme Court majority opinions in Orr and Daulton. Leibson
stated that the statute was flawed because it was irreconcilable with the
"indivisible injury" theory' upon which joint and several liability is
based and that Orr and Daulton, by analogy, unnecessarily extended the
statute to dismissed parties."' Leibson based this assertion on the
premise that reducing a defendant's liability by an absent party's
percentage of fault benefits the wrongdoer at the expense of the
victim.' Leibson pointed out that Prudential Life exemplifies the
inequity of that result because the plaintiff, who was not at fault, only
received compensation for half of his ijury.' According to Justice
Leibson, in this situation, the negligent defendant should bear the loss
rather than the innocent victim.
The tension between the opinions of Justice Vance and Justice
Leibsoni' underscores the diverse motivations of each in adopting
comparative negligence. Although these differences at first may seem
academic, they have proved to be the root of an ongoing split in the
Kentucky Supreme Court in subsequent apportionment decisions.""
" Id. The indivisible injury theory is the primary justification for the imposition of
joint liability and is based on the assumption that certain results by their nature are
incapable of practical division. When two or more causes combine, producing a single
result such as death or a broken leg, the damages are viewed as incapable of allocation.
Hence, courts have imposed the entire liability on each party whose negligence was a
substantial factor in causing the loss. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 347.
'2, Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 508 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
1- Id.
123 Id. at 509.
124 Id. at 510.
12" Justice Vance's statement in his concurring opinion in Prudential Life reveals the
extent of this tension:
The author [Leibson] of the majority opinion in Hilen v. Hays, supra, which
held it basically unfair to charge a plaintiff with a greater share of the loss than
his percentage of fault would justify, now dissents from a holding that it is
basically unfair to charge a defendant with a greater share of the loss than his
percentage of fault would justify. The dissent considers it fair for a defendant
who is only 50% responsible for an injury to be saddled with 100% of the
liability.
Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 505 (Vance, J., concurring).
2 See Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky.
1990) (apportioning fault to a third-party defendant); Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817,
821 (Ky. 1990) (holding the defendant responsible for the entire injury when the jury
apportioned no fault to the settling party); Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430,
433 (Ky. 1988) (apportioning fault to a party who had settled with the plaintiff before
trial even though the plaintiff did not assert a claim against the settling party); Prudential
Life, 696 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1985) (apportioning fault to a party who had been
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Justice Vance's position is that joint and several liability does not survive
the move to comparative negligence.'27 In contrast, Justice Leibson's
position is that joint and several liability should be retained in fairness to
plaintiffs, despite its inconsistency with comparative fault principles."'
The Prudential Life decision was an important cornerstone upon
which Kentucky's apportionment law would be built. Although the
majority did not explicitly base its decision on comparative fault
principles, the opinion did signify a change in the attitude of the court,
which was beginning to show less of an absolute concern for the recovery
of the plaintiff and more concern for reaching an equitable result for all
parties. The result in Prudential Life is arguably not unfair to the plaintiff
because it was within the plaintiff's control to bring the claim within the
time prescribed by the statute of limitations. Requiring the remaining
defendant to pay for the plaintiffs failure to bring the claim within the
statutory period would not have been fair. However, the applicability of
such principles to situations in which the claim is dismissed for some
reason outside of the plaintiff's control remains open.
In the year following Prudential Life, the court handed down a
decision that seemed somewhat to back away from its prior decisions. In
Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell,"z the plaintiff, who was injured by
a post-hole digger, sued the manufacturer and the rental company.' 0 He
settled with the manufacturer on the eve of trial for $10,000,' and the
jury rendered a verdict for $17,956 against the rental company." The
rental company did not request an apportionment instruction, and the jury
did not receive one. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that an
apportionment instruction against the settling party will not be given if
not requested and that the remaining defendant should pay the entire
amount of damages, minus a credit for the amount paid by the settler.'
In rationalizing its decision, the court retreated to the indivisible
injury theory that had seemed to be extinguished, or at least discredited,
dismissed because the statute of limitations had run).
'27 See Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 29-30 (Vance, J.) (reversing a required contribution by a
defendant on the ground that it exceeds the defendant's liability under apportionment).
- See id. at 33 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (protesting the apportionment scheme that
abolishes the plaintiff's right to recover from a third-party tortfeasor by refusing to apply
"equal shares!' contribution among tortfeasors).
'29 700 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1985).
,"0 Id. at 790.
131 Id. at 791.
Id. at 790.
'1 Id. at 794.
'34 Id. at 796.
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by Hilen v. Hays.35 The court noted the long-standing tort rule that
"where two or more persons are potentially liable for a single indivisible
harm, a payment by or on behalf of any of them shall be a credit against
the total amount due."" The opinion explained that the purpose of the
rule was to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff'37 The reason that
apportioning fault does not solve the double recovery problem is that
apportionment presupposes the fault of the settler.' When, as in Burke,
no instruction is given, no fault is attributed to the settler. Thus, there
should be no apportionment.139 In order to prevent a plaintiff from
receiving a double recovery in such a situation, the remaining defendant
should be given a credit.'
Burke appears to be an illogical decision on many levels. First,
Orp4 and Daulton4' seemed to mandate that juries apportion fault
to settling parties in order to encourage settlement. Burke, in contrast,
gives plaintiffs and defendants the option of agreeing to joint liability
principles rather than apportionment.43 Justice Leibson pointed out this
inconsistency in his dissenting opinion and suggested that the court
overrule Orr.'" Justice Leibson's approach would be to restrict appor-
tionment to the original confines of KRS section 454.040, that is, to
defendants who are present at trial when the judgment is rendered, and
to give defendants against whom the jury awards full damages a credit for
the amount paid by a settling tortfeasor145 This approach, Leibson
argued, is the only way that the plaintiff will ever receive the amount of
damages fixed by the jury. If fault is apportioned, he will invariably
either receive a windfall (if the jury apportions little or no fault to the
settler), or be sorely undercompensated (if the jury apportions a large
portion of fault to the settler).'"
Justice Leibson's approach, which is one of three suggested by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 47 is followed by several other jurisdic-
131 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984). See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
136 Burke, 700 S.W.2d at 794.
'37 Id. at 795.
13" Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
142 Daulton v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1976).
'4 Rogers, supra note 45, at 121.
" Burke, 700 S.W.2d at 797-98 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 799.
'46 Id. at 797-98.
17 ESTATBMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 886A cmt. m (1975).
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tions that have adopted comparative negligence.'48 One of the other
Restatement approaches is to reduce the plaintiffs recovery by the
percentage of the settling tortfeasor's liability for damages as apportioned
by the jury.'49 Justice Wintersheimer, who dissented in Burke, argued
that this approach should be applied across the board.' The approach
taken by the Burke majority is a hybrid of Justice Leibson's and Justice
Wintersheimer's approach.'
One of the last cases to be decided before enactment of the 1988
statute' is also one of the most noted and significant. In Floyd v.
Carlisle Construction Co.,5 3 the Kentucky Supreme Court approved
apportionment of fault to ajoint tortfeasor who was not named as a party
to the action." In a thorough analysis of the majority's position on
apportionment of fault to multiple defendants, Justice Vance emphatically
stated that a tortfeasor who is not actually a defendant will be tfeated as
a party to the action for apportionment purposes if he has "bought his
peace" with the plaintiff before trial or if the claim against him has been
dismissed.'55 The opinion also made it clear that the apportionment of
'" See American Motorcycle Assoc. v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 915 (Cal. 1979)
(holding that a release or covenant entered into in good faith will reduce a joint
tortfeasor's liability dollar for dollar and bar contribution from the settler) (superseded by
statute, CAL. Civ. CODE § 143 (West 1994)).
14- Id. The third Restatement approach is to hold the nonsettling defendant liable for
the whole amount and allow him contribution from the settling party if he pays more than
his fair share. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. m (1975). This approach
obviously discourages settlement and provides the plaintiff with a windfall. A fourth
approach, which is followed in New York, is to reduce the defendant's liability by either
the dollar amount of the settlement or the percentage of fault apportioned to the settler,
whichever is the greater amount. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 20, at 398.
0 Burke, 700 S.W.2d at 798 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting); see also Orr v. Coleman,
455 S.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Ky. 1970) (giving sample jury instruction that would achieve this
result).
... The soundness of the Burke approach may be somewhat academic. It is hard to
envision a situation in which both the plaintiff and the defendant would find a strategic
advantage in not requesting an apportionment instruction. Aside from an oversight, this
situation would only arise if the defendant viewed the settlement as being so high that he
would be better off with a credit and the plaintiff viewed the settlement as being so low
that he would be better off if the defendant were given a credit. Indicative of the scarcity
with which this will occur is the fact that since Burke, there has been no reported case
in which an apportionment instruction was not requested. Search of LEXIS, Kentucky
library, Case file (Jan. 3, 1994).
"2 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Baldwin 1993).
1 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1988).
1I4 Id. at 432.
"' Id.
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fault to someone who is no longer a party to the action would not impose
liability on them or warrant ajudgment against them. Rather, the sole purpose
of apportionment is to determine the amount of responsibility of the
remaining parties and thereby limit their amount of liability."s
The Floyd decision is particularly significant in that the court took one
more step in the direction of apportioning fault to "nonparties" by apportion-
ing to a party who had never had a formal claim brought against them. The
majority considered its decision to be a "natural consequence of [its] decision
in Hilen v. Hays"'" that liability should be limited to the extent of a party's
fault.5 ' The opinion also indicated, in dicta, that if given the opportunity,
the court would ovemde Nlix v. Jordan'59 and allow apportionment to
third-party defendants without contribution.'60 Floyd illustrates the eager-
ness of the Kentucky Supreme Court to extend the reaches of apportionment
of liability to multiple defendants.
In Floyd, Justice Leibson again vigorously dissented' to the majority
opinion, criticizing the court's willingness to confront issues not before it and
insisting that apportionment of fault to parties who are "noncollectible" is not
in line with Hilen v. Hays and instead permits defendants to evade liability
by "throwing blame on an unnamed person."'62 Leibson's argument rests
on the premise that apportionment should not be applied when the plaintiff
has accepted some nominal settlement without naming the settling tortfeasor
as a defendant.' Leibson asserted that in all prior cases in which the court
had approved apportionment pursuant to Orr," it was the plaintiff's
decision to sue a party that had triggered the defendant's right to an
apportionment instruction.65 In Floyd, the plaintiff had not made such a
choice, though he still could have prevented apportionment by not accepting
the nominal settlement from the potential defendant. Nevertheless, Leibson
views Floyd as a "critical departure from established precedent."'"
56 Id.
1"7 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) (adopting comparative negligence based on the
principle that liability should be equal to fault).
.. Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 432.
19 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975), overrded by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc.
v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990). For a description of Nix, see supra notes 85-90
and accompanying text.
Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 432 n.1.
1 Id. at 433 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
1,, Id. at 435.
1 Id. at 434.
14 See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
1 Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 434 (Leibson, 3., dissenting).
16 Id.
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C. Summary of the Law Prior to the Enactment of KRS Section
411.182
At the time the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Floyd, the
Kentucky legislature was in the process of enacting KRS section 411.182,
which was intended to clarify this area of the law." Prior to enactment
of the statute, there were primarily three situations in which fault could
be apportioned. Under KRS section 454.040,'" the jury had the option
of either apportioning liability among defendants present at trial or
rendering a joint judgment against them.69 Fault could also be appor-
tioned to "nonparties," or parties who were no longer present at trial, in
two situations. First, under Or17 and Floyd,"" the jury was required
to apportion liability to a settling party, subject to the Burke" limita-
tion that if an apportionment instruction against a settling party were not
requested, none would be given. Second, the Daulton7 /Prudential
Litfe rule mandated that fault be apportioned to a party who had been
dismissed before or during trial, "whatever may have been the rea-
son."
175
Prior to the enactment of KRS section 411.182, the plaintiff retained
a strategic advantage and could control the outcome in almost every
167 See Kevin Tucker & Assocs. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1992) (noting that while K.R.S. § 411.182 is the relevant statute, case law is still
important in applying apportionment principles).
z" See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
1 See Rogers, supra note 45, at 104-05 (discussing the state of the law in Kentucky
prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.
1984)).
170 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970). See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
1 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1988). See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
" 700 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1985). See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
173 538 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1976). See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
174 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985). See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
' Daulton, 538 S.W.2d at 308; see also Prudential Life, 696 S.W.2d at 504. The
court has never addressed whether the Burke limitation, discussed supra notes 129-46,
would apply in this situation. Theoretically, Burke should apply, because the reasoning
behind Burke was that apportionment presupposes a finding of fault. It seems anomalous
to allow the parties the option in one situation, and not to allow it in an analogous
situation. However, if it is hard to fathom a situation in which neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant would find an advantage in not requesting an apportionment instruction against
a settling party, it is impossible to imagine a situation in which a defendant would not
find it advantageous to have fault apportioned to a party who has been dismissed from
the action. In that situation, the defendant has everything to gain and nothing to lose.
Conversely, the plaintiff will invariably find an advantage in not requesting an instruction.
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situation in which apportionment was possible. '76 The plaintiff could
always avoid apportionment by not joining a particular tortfeasor as a
party to the action and by not settling with him before trial. Therefore,
the plaintiff could exercise his discretion by not suing or settling with
friends or relatives who might have played a major role in causing the
accident and still recover the full amount of his damages from the named
defendant, even though the defendant caused only a small part of the
accident.177 Similarly, the plaintiff could choose not to sue financially
insecure tortfeasors and recover the full amount from "deep pockets" who
would have little or no chance of getting contribution from an insolvent
joint tortfeasor. Therefore, prior to KRS section 411.182, the nonparty
"scapegoat" which would serve to reduce the defendant's liability, only
existed if the plaintiff himself provided it.
The result of the law as it existed was the defeat of one of the major
policies behind Orr"8 and Daulton,179 encouraging settlement and
the inconsistent application of the other principal justification behind
apportionment, that each party's liability should be limited to his amount
of fault. For instance, why should the jury be required to apportion fault
to a settling party and not to a defendant who is still present at trial? In
either situation, if the jury did not apportion, at least one defendant ran
the risk of paying much more of the judgment than the portion for which
he was responsible.
The court's decisions provided the plaintiff with the luxury of
controlling the situation by drawing the line beyond which fault would
be apportioned at the point where the plaintiff lost his strategic advantage.
By 1988, however, this line had become rather blurred. For example,
although Nix 80 which prohibited apportionment of fault to third-party
defendants on the premise that they were not "defendants as to the
original plaintiff''. remained valid, the Floyd" majority had subse-
176 The one exception to this rule was the situation in which the jury had the option
of apportioning pursuant to KRS section 454.040.
177 See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1987) (upholding
trial court's joint judgment against Walt Disney World for eighty-six percent of the
plaintiff's damages even though the jury had only apportioned one percent of fault to the
company because the fianc6, who was found to be eighty-five percent at fault, was not
a party to the action).
17 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970). See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
1 538 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1976). See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
0 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975), overruled by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc.
v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
. Id. at 763.
2 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 n.1 (Ky. 1988).
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quently put the Nix ruling in serious jeopardy by expressing a desire to
overrule the decision.
Therefore, as of 1988, Kentucky law regarding the liability of
multiple defendants was a hybrid of joint and several liability and
apportionment of liability according to fault.' At that time, the destiny
of Kentucky apportionment law was far from settled, but one point of
certainty was that change was on its way. From the time that Orr"
was decided in 1970 to the time KRS section 411.182 was passed in
1988, Kentucky common law underwent a clear, steady progression away
from joint and several liability toward a more equitable system of
apportioning liability in tort actions to both parties and nonparties
according to fault.'85 The statute that the legislature enacted in 1988
answered many of the questions and responded to many of the inconsis-
tencies that were left by the court's long string of decisions while, at the
same time, leaving a few questions of its own behind.
I. ThE KENTucKY LEGISLATURE STEPS IN
A. KRS Section 411.182 and Allocation of Fault in Tort Actions
On July 15, 1988, KRS section 411.182 became effective. The
statute, which applies to all tort actions involving injuries taking place
subsequent to its enactment, reads as follows:
(1) In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving
fault of more than one party to the action, including third-party
defendants and persons who have been released under subsection (4) of
this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall
instruct the jury to answer interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall
make findings indicating:
(a) The amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to
recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each
claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party
..3 It is important to remember, however, that because KRS section 454.040, discussed
supra notes 71-72, had been on the books for a number of years, Kentucky technically
never had pure joint and several liability, even before it adopted comparative negligence
principles.
184 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
.. See supra notes 69-184 and accompanying text.
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defendant, and person who has been released from liability under
subsection (4) of this section.
(2) In determining the percentages of fault the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the
extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed.
(3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each
claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under
subsection (4) of this section, and shall determine and state in the
judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant
in accordance with the respective percentages of fault.
(4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into
by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all
liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any
other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides.
However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall
be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the
obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this
section."s
The Kentucky General Assembly modeled the statute after portions
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.'" Perhaps the most important
aspect of KRS section 411.182 is not the portions of the Uniform Act
that it includes but, instead, the portions that it does not include. First, the
Kentucky Act completely omits the section in the Uniform Act which
provides for joint and several liability.' In addition, the Kentucky
General Assembly intentionally omitted sections of the Uniform Act
dealing with set-off, contribution, and enforcement of contribution. 9
The modem trend for states that have retained joint and several
liability after adopting comparative fault is to also allow contribution
1" KY. RE,. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Baldwin 1993).
'" UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 2(c), 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
"g UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(c), 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981) states:
The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance
with the findings, subject to any reduction under section 6 [the equivalent of
411.182 section (4)] and enter judgment against each party liable on the basis
of joint and several liability. For purposes of contribution under sections 4 and
5, the court also shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable
share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective per-
centages of fault.
Compare this to KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(3) (Baldwin 1993).
1"9 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr §§ 3-5, 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
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among defendants based on pure comparative fault. 9' In contrast, those
states that have abandoned joint and several liability have recognized the
futility of retaining contribution..9  The omission of the joint and
several liability and contribution provisions from the Kentucky statute
indicates an intention of the General Assembly to abrogate joint and
several liability, thereby obviating the need for contribution.
KRS section 411.182 does not significantly depart from the Kentucky
Supreme Court's treatment of liability of multiple tortfeasors. Although
the court's earlier decisions had retained joint and several liability in
limited situations," the court seemed to be heading slowly in the
direction of abandoning joint and several liability altogether. In fact,
abandonment of joint and several liability is directly aligned with the
court's reasoning in Orr,' Daulton,194 Hilen, 95 Prudential Lifet' 96
and Floyd.' However, while at first glance it appears that the General
Assembly intended to abrogate joint and several liability completely, a
190 Philip D. Oliver, Once Is Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured Employee's
Cause of Action Against a Third Party, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 117, 131-33 (1989)
(discussing the trend regarding methods of compensation in tort actions since the advent
of worker's compensation).
'9' WOODS, supra note 7, at 227. The effect of adopting comparative negligence and
abolishing joint and several liability is the elimination of any basis for contribution in
those states. The reason is that if each party's liability is limited to his extent of fault,
each party will only have paid for his fair share of responsibility and will thus never be
entitled to contribution from any other party. Id.
'9 The situations in which joint and several liability was not completely abandoned
were those involving third-party defendants, Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 762 (Ky.
1975), overruled by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29
(Ky. 1990), and where the jury exercised its discretion not to apportion under KRS
section 454.040. The court had not yet directly addressed whether there would still be
joint verdicts rendered in cases where no claim was ever asserted against a tortfeasor.
1 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970) (holding that apportionment to a settling tortfeasor
is mandatory). See supra notes 69-83.
"4 538 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1976) (holding that fault should be apportioned to a
defendant who has been dismissed from the suit for any reason). See supra notes 95-103
and accompanying text.
193 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) (adopting comparative fault based on the premise
that liability should be limited to fault). See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
'96 696 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1985) (reaffirming Daulton by holding that fault should
be apportioned to a defendant dismissed by the court because the statute of limitations
had expired). See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
'97 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988) (holding that fault should be apportioned to a
tortfeasor with whom the plaintiff had settled but had never named as a party to the
action based on the premise that liability of named defendants should be limited to the
amount of damages caused by their fault). See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
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closer look at particular situations raises some questions about the statute's
application.
Some recent decisions in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
attempted to apply section 411.182 indicate that joint and several liability
might not be completely dead and that in situations in which it has been
abandoned, new issues must be addressed."8 The Kentucky Supreme Court
has not yet had the opportunity to apply the statute because of its prospective
nature. Yet, in several recent decisions, the court discussed section 411.182
while acknowledging its inapplicability to the case before it."' These
decisions have embraced the posture of the statute and are indicative of what
the court's interpretation will be ' A brief look at some of these decisions
sheds light on the future of apportionment of liability law in Kentucky tort
actions.
B. Apportionment to Third-Party Defendants
KRS section 411.182 expressly provides for apportionment of liability to
third-party defendants0 ' This means that for the first time under Kentucky
'"S ee Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc. v. Scott & Ritter Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873, 875
(Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that when a third-party defendant is joined, the claim
against him must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because if fault is to be
apportioned, the defendant does not have a claim against the third-party defendant)
(discussed infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text); Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559,
564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to apportion fault to a negligent tortfeasor who had
intentionally not been named as a party to the action) (discussed infra notes 293-302 and
accompanying text).
99 Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1990);
Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1990). Justice Leibson adamantly voiced his
disapproval of this approach in his dissents to these two decisions. For example, in
Stratton, he accused the majority of inappropriately using the case to "expound views on
apportionment issues not involved in this case." Stratton, 793 S.W.2d at 821. He went on
to assert that in expounding its views, the majority "erroneously characterizes the meaning
and effect of a number of earlier cases." Id. In his lengthy dissent from the majority
decision in Dbx, which was joined by Justices Combs and Lambert, Leibson again
attacked the majority's approach:
NONE OF THESE ISSUES ARE BEFORE US. Yet the Majority Opinion
speaks to all... of these issues in derogation of the limits of judicial power
which extend only to deciding cases in controversy. . . . Justice Vance's Opinion
acknowledges, in a backhand manner, that he raises and decides issues which
are not framed by the decision of the trial court nor raised by the parties on
appeal.
Dx, 799 S.W.2d at 33-34.
m See Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky.
1990) (approving apportionment of liability to third-party defendant) (discussed infra
notes 204-22 and accompanying text).
2" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)(b) (Baldwin 1993).
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law, the plaintiff does not completely dictate which parties will have fault
apportioned to them. Hence, the plaintiff can no longer avoid apportion-
ment and recover fully from a defendant who is only partially at fault by
not bringing an action against a negligent friend, relative, or financially
unstable tortfeasor. The defendant can prevent such a result by bringing
a third-party claim against the unnamed joint tortfeasor. The Kentucky
Supreme Court expressed a desire to reach this result in Nix, but believed
that it was statutorily restrained from doing so. 2
Dix & Associates Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key,2 3 was the first
case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court approved apportionment of
liability to a third-party defendant, expressly overruling Nix v. Jor-
dan. 4 Although KRS section 411.182 was not even arguably applica-
ble to the case because the facts arose prior to the statute's enactment, it
undoubtedly had an effect on the court's decision. In Dix, a deceased
worker's estate filed a tort action against a negligent party, who filed a
third-party complaint against the plaintiff s employer."' The employer
subsequently filed a counterclaim against the original defendant to recover
the workers' compensation that it had paid to the deceased employee's
family.206 Before trial, the original action was settled and dismissed,
leaving the third-party claim for indemnity and/or contribution and the
subrogation claim.0 7
At trial, the jury apportioned ninety-five percent of the fault to the
defendant and five percent of the fault to the employer (the third-party
defendant).08 The court held that it was proper for the jury to apportion
fault to the employer as a third-party defendant.2 9 The only way for the
court to reach this result was to overrule Nix, 210 since the statute
approving apportionment to third-party defendants was inapplicable to the
Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975), overruled by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline
Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990). "Though it might otherwise
make good sense to apply the principle of apportionment among joint tortfeasors without
exception, the authority for Orr v. Coleman, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 59 (1970) derives from a
statute (KRS 454.040) which cannot fairly be construed that liberally." Id. at 763.
799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1990).
2 799 S.W.2d at 29.
2" Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
' Id. at 26.
2 Id.
2 Id. at 29.
210 Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. 1975) (holding that fault could not be
apportioned to third-party defendants), overruled by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors,
Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
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case.2 ' In overruling Nix, the court also necessarily overruled another
decision" 2 that had relied on Nix to the extent that Nix precluded
apportionment of liability between an employer and a third person from
whom the employee sought recovery of damages.2"3
Dix is an important decision in a number of respects. First, it not only
approved apportionment of liability to a third-party defendant, but,
specifically, to a third-party defendant employer which was immune from
further liability2 4 under KRS section 342.690, which states that if an
employer secures payment of compensation as required by that chapter,
workers' compensation shall be the exclusive source of liability to which
he can be held.215 KRS section 342.690 specifically mentions suits in
which an employer may be liable to a defendant who may be liable for
or who has paid damages to an employee of the employer.2 6 In that
situation, the statute allows the named defendant to seek contribution
from the employer but limits his recovery to the amount for which the
employer can be held liable in workers' compensation benefits.2 7
After Dix, the employer still enjoys limited liability. However, when
a defendant joins an employer as a third-party defendant and fault is
apportioned, the outcome differs from the traditional result under workers'
compensation law. According to KRS section 342.700, an employee has
the option of recovering compensation benefits or proceeding at law
against the negligent third party.21 ' If he elects to collect worker's
compensation, he cannot collect the full amount of his damages in a tort
claim. 219 Before Dix, this meant that the employee who had been paid
workers' compensation for an injury could sue a negligent third party and
recover for the full amount of his damages. The employer, however, was
entitled to intervene and recoup out of the employee's recovery the full
211 Dbx, 799 S.W.2d at 33 n.2 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
12 See Burrell v. Electric Plant Bd. of Franklin, Ky., 676 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. 1984)
(relying on Nix in precluding apportionment of liability between an employer and third
person from whom the employee sought to recover damages), overruled by Dix & Assocs.
Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 794 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
74 Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 29. In overruling Burrell, the Dix court noted that Burrell was
decided shortly after the court adopted comparative negligence in Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984), and that the court had not yet had time to consider all of
the ramifications of comparative negligence. Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 28.
214 Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 29.
215 KY. REV. STAT. Am. § 342.690(1) (Baldwin 1993).
m6 Id.
217 Id.
-8 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.700(1) (Baldwin 1993).
219 Id.
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amount of workers' compensation that he had paid." Therefore, the
employer escaped liability without regard to his fault.
After Dix, a different result is reached. An injured worker can only
recover from a negligent defendant to the extent of the defendant's
fault.' The employer is thus entitled to recoup from the plaintiff's
settlement or judgment the percentage of the amount paid, or payable, as
compensation benefits equal to the percentage of fault apportioned to the
negligent defendant. m For example, assume that a plaintiff is injured
at work and receives $100,000 in workers' compensation benefits from his
employer. Assume further that ajury decides that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover $200,000 in total damages, apportioning seventy-five percent
of the fault to the defendant and twenty-five percent of the fault to the
employer, whom the defendant joined as a third-party defendant. The
negligent defendant must pay $150,000, seventy-five percent of the total
damages. The employer is subject to no further liability and can recover
$75,000 from the $150,000 judgment, which represents the amount of
damages attributable to the other tortfeasor's negligence multiplied by the
total amount for which he is liable in workers' compensation.' The
injured employee is left with the $75,000 remaining from the judgment
plus the $100,000 he previously received in workers' compensation
benefits. Thus, the plaintiff ends up with $175,000. He receives less than
his total damages because he chose to settle with the employer by taking
workers' compensation benefits.
This result is consistent with the underlying policy of KRS section
342.700, which prohibits the worker from recovering from both workers'
compensation and a tort claim.' Workers' compensation is considered
to be a full settlement; thus, the amount of workers' compensation
benefits paid must be reduced by an amount proportional to the other
negligent party's fault in order to be consistent with an apportionment
scheme. Under this result, the employer pays for his amount of fault in
workers' compensation benefits, the defendant pays for his amount of
fault in damages, and the plaintiff receives compensation for his injuries
without receiving a windfall.
Although the court in Dix approved apportionment to the employer
as a third-party defendant,'m the court's decision might have broader
mo Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 30-31.
2' Id. at 31.
2 Id. at 30-31.
' This is the percentage of the workers' compensation benefits equal to the third
party's percentage of fault as determined by the jury.
m Dix, 799 S.W.2d at 30.
' Id. at 29.
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implications. Writing for the majority, Justice Vance, in dicta, analogized
workers' compensation coverage to a settlement between an employee and
employer whereby the employee settles his tort claim for the amount that
he will receive as compensation.' 6 This analogy follows the policy that
underlies apportionment law. A natural extension of Justice Vance's
position is that fault can be apportioned to an employer who has paid
workers' compensation even if he is not joined as a third-party defendant.
Therefore, just as a joint tortfeasor who has settled his claim before trial
can have fault apportioned to him but is liable for no more than the
amount for which he settled, an employer can have fault apportioned to
it but is liable for no more than the amount of workers' compensation that
it has paid or will pay.
Requesting an apportionment instruction against the employer without
joining him as a third-party defendant would always be to a defendant's
strategic advantage. This strategy would minimize the adversity to the
defendant's position by providing the opportunity to have a greater
amount of fault apportioned to the employer, thereby reducing the
defendant's liability. 7 There is no real reason to require the employer to
be present at trial since he cannot be held liable for any further damages
and thus has very little incentive to oppose the accusations against him.
The employer does, however, retain the right to bring a subrogation
action in order to recover the workers' compensation benefits that he has
paid, so he may in some instances ultimately become a party to the
action' -
Aside from the many extraneous implications of D/x, the opinion
makes it clear that a majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court fully agrees
with the General Assembly's decision to apply apportionment of liability
' Id. "For all practical purposes, in this case, Dix & Associates occupies the position
of a tort-feasor which has settled the tort claim against it." Id.
' In Justice Leibson's dissent in Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 433
(Ky. 1988) (Leibson, J., dissenting), he quoted the defense attorney's response to a
question during oral argument about why he did not file a third-party complaint against
the released defendant: "'Whywould any defense attorney bring someone into a case who
obviously would be antagonistic to them if they did not have to?"' Id. at 433.
Justice Leibson views this as an undesirable result. However, the plaintiff in this
situation has ample opportunity to rebut the defendant's evidence of the third party's
negligence in order to preserve the damage award to which he is entitled. Nevertheless,
there does seem to be a bothersome overtone in allowing two parties to litigate a third
party's negligence in the third party's absence.
' How often the employer would exert the time and effort involved in bringing a
subrogation claim in order to recover the minimal workers' compensation that he has or
will be required to pay is another matter.
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to third-party defendants. In a recently decided case, however, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has once again muddied the water in the area
of apportionment. In Kevin Tucker & Associates v. Scott & Ritter,
Inc., the city of Bowling Green brought a negligence and breach of
contract action against an architectural firm for faulty construction of a
golf course.2" The architect filed a third-party complaint for contribu-
tion against the building contractor under Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure 14' The court held that because Floyd'2 and KRS sec-
tion 411.182 make it mandatory to apportion fault to each tortfeasor, the
third-party complaint had to be dismissed for failure to state a claim.'
Under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 14, a third-party
complaint can only be brought if the third-party defendant is, or may be,
liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. 5 The
contractor in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. could not possibly have been liable
to the architect if fault were to be apportioned, because under apportion-
ment it is impossible for the architect to be held liable for anyone's fault
other than his own. The very idea behind apportionment is that each
party's liability should be limited to his amount of faulty Civil Rule
14 allows a defendant to bring third-party claims against other tortfeasors
that are, or may be, liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against the defendant. 7 Consequently, when a defendant is held
liable only to the extent of his own fault, a third party will never be liable
to the defendant because the defendant will have paid only for the
amount of damages for which he was responsible. Nevertheless, in a
footnote in the opinion, the Kevin Tucker & Assocs. court encouraged
defendants to continue bringing third-party claims because without an
"active assertion of a claim" against a party, fault cannot be appor-
tioned." Therefore, if the Kevin Tucker & Assocs. decision is followed,
defendants will bring claims against third parties in an attempt to have
fault apportioned to those parties, but the claims will routinely be
dismissed. In other words, the court encouraged form over substance in
m 842 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
230 Id. at 873-74.
21 Id. at 874.
232 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1988). See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
23 Kevin Tucker & Assocs., 842 S.W.2d at 874.
n KY. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
23 Kevin Tucker & Assocs., 842 S.W.2d at 874 n.5.
23" PRossER ET AL., supra note 20, at 575.
2'7 Ky. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
23' Kevin Tucker & Assocs., 842 S.W.2d at 874 n.5 (citing Floyd v. Carlisle Constr.
Co., 758 S.W.2d 430. 432 (Ky. 1988)).
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order to allow apportionment of fault to as many negligent parties as
possible.
The court of appeals rested its decision in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. on
a number of assumptions. First, the court assumed that the Burke239
rule, which requires an apportionment instruction only if requested by one
of the parties, did not survive the enactment of KRS section 411.182. If
Burke was not superseded by the statute, then there was no failure to state
a claim in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. unless an apportionment instruction
was requested because, if no apportionment instruction is requested or
given, the possibility of contribution would still exist. Although the use
of the word "shall" in the statute suggests that apportionment of fault is
mandatory, the word "shall' is qualified by the phrase 'nless otherwise
agreed by all parties." ' This clause might indicate an intention by the
Kentucky General Assembly to retain the Burke rule."4 More impor-
tantly, in a post-statute decision, Stratton v. Parker,"  the Kentucky
Supreme Court faced a prime opportunity to overrule Burke when Burke's
ruling stood in the way of apportioning fault to a settling tortfeasor.
Instead of taking advantage of this opportunity, however, the court
distinguished Stratton on the basis that no apportionment instruction was
requested or given in Burke, whereas such an instruction was requested
in Stratton. 3
700 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Ky. 1985) (holding that ifno apportionment instruction was
requested by either party, none would be given and joint and several damages would be
issued with the possibility of contribution). See supra notes 129-46.
24 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1) (Baldwin 1993).
24' However, the construction of the statute alone is not convincing enough to
conclude that Burke lives. It is doubtful that the language of the statute was intended to
preserve the Burke result because the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" was taken directly
from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Besides, Burke seems to say that no
apportionment instruction will be given "unless otherwise agreed," whereas the statute
indicates the opposite, that an apportionment instruction will be given unless otherwise
agreed.
2 2 793 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1990).
243 See id. at 820. In Stratton the plaintiff brought an action against three defendants,
one with which he settled before trial, one which had the claim against it dismissed before
trial, and one which was present at trial. At trial, the jury apportioned twenty-five percent
to the defendant, seventy-five percent to the plaintiff, and zero percent to the settling
tortfeasor. The trial court allowed the defendant a credit for the amount paid by the
settler, citing Burke, and the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Leibson blamed the
problems incurred by the trial court and court of appeals in reaching their decisions on
the "ill conceived result' that the court reached in Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 700
S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1985). He went on to say, "[i]n my [d]issenting [o]pinion. . . , I warned
of the internal inconsistency between the principles of law involved and the result
reached. ... The present [o]pinion can but add to the vexatious problems faced by our
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Another assumption implicit in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. is that fault
will not be apportioned to a party unless there is an active assertion of a
claim against him.2 4 The Kevin Tucker & Assocs. court relied on the
supreme court's decision in Floyd in making this assumption. In Floyd,
the court reviewed its prior cases, which stated that fault would be
apportioned whenever there is an "active assertion of a claim" against a
party.245 However, it also stated that a party's liability would be limited
to a percentage of the damages equal to his amount of fault.2" These
two statements become logically inconsistent when there is a negligent
party who has not had a claim asserted against him.
For instance, if a plaintiff does not bring a claim against his negligent
brother-in-law, Kevin Tucker & Assocs. assumes that fault will not be
apportioned against the brother-in-law unless the defendant pursues a
third-party complaint. 7 Consequently, the court of appeals encouraged
defendants to continue to assert third-party complaints that, under its
analysis, must necessarily be dismissed. If the defendant fails to actively
assert a third-party complaint and fault is not apportioned, the defendant
will be required to pay the entire amount of damages, even if he is only
fifty percent, ten percent, or even one percent at fault.2 Therefore, it
is illogical to state a rule that fault will only be apportioned to parties
against which there has been an active assertion of a claim, and in the
next breath, state a policy that each party's liability is limited to the
portion of damages caused by his fault. This whole scenario can be
avoided under a construction of the statute which allows apportionment
of fault across the board, even without an active assertion of a claim.24
Assuming that the court of appeals' procedural analysis is correct, the
literal reading of Civil Rule 14 in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. is more a
trial courts seeking a way to deal with unworkable opinions." Stratton, 793 S.W.2d at
822-23 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
4 Kevin Tucker & Assocs. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873, 874 n.5 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1992).
24 Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988); accord Daulton
v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1976); Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975),
ovemded by Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky.
1990); Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1970).
'4 Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 432.
17 Kevin Tucker &Assocs., 842 S.W.2d at 874 n.5.
' See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987) (upholding the
trial court's judgment against Walt Disney World for eighty-six percent of the plaintiff's
damages even though the jury only found the company to be one percent at fault).
'A' The soundness of such an application of the current law will be discussed in the
next section of this Note.
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matter of form than substance and creates difficulties that surely were not
intended by the General Assembly. Reading Civil Rule 14 to mandate
that a third-party claim be asserted and dropped simultaneously would
defeat the purpose of the General Assembly in providing for the
allocation of fault to "third-party defendants" in KRS section
411.182(1)(b).o Additionally, the Dix court expressed no intention to
produce such a result when it approved apportionment to third-party
defendants."'
The court of appeals in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. expressed discontent
with the apportionment law as it now stands, but purported to be merely
following the precedent to which it is bound2 2 No precedent set by the
Kentucky Supreme Court or the General Assembly, however, mandates
the result reached in Kevin Tucker & Assocs. Desirability of the result is
also far from clear. The damage is slight in cases where the third-party
defendant is an immune tortfeasor from whom the plaintiff has already
recovered, such as an employer. Dix indicates that the defendant could get
an apportionment instruction in that situation, even without bringing a
third-party claim.' 3 However, the Kevin Tucker & Assocs. rule encour-
ages plaintiffs to bring claims against as many potential defendants as
possible, and defendants to assert claims against as many third-party
defendants as possible. This result is diametrically opposed to the policy
of encouraging settlement that played a major role in bringing apportion-
ment to Kentucky in the first place.' At best, the holding in Kevin
Tucker & Assocs. encourages the assertion of claims that would have
never been brought before this decision; at worst, Kevin Tucker & Assocs.
encourages defendants to assert third-party complaints, regardless of their
merit, for the sole purpose of getting an apportionment instruction which
will reduce the defendant's liability once the claim is dismissed for
"failure to state a claim."
'o John M. Rogers, The Demise of Joint and Several Liability: RLP.?, Speech at
Kentucky Continuing Legal Education Seminar (July 14, 1990) (unpublished manuscript
at 3, on file with the author).
"" Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
See supra notes 203-26 for a discussion of Dix.
' Kevin Tucker & Assocs., 842 S.W.2d at 874 n.3. ('We do not believe that these
rules are good policy; they seem to produce unjust results in many cases. See Justice
Leibson's dissents in Dix and Moody, supra. Nevertheless, until the Legislature or
Supreme Court changes them, we are bound to follow them.") (citation omitted).
m Dix, 779 S.W.2d at 27-28.
' See supra notes 69-104 and accompanying text (discussing Kentucky's policy of
using apportionment to encourage settlement).
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If the technical reading of Civil Rule 14 by the Kevin Tucker &
Assocs. court is permitted to stand, the rule should be amended to allow
defendants to assert third-party claims against parties who are, or may be,
liable to the plaintiff for all, or part, of his injury. The Rule was written
to accommodate a system of joint and several liability with the possibility
of contribution or indemnity and, as written, has no place in a compara-
tive negligence system. If, in enacting KRS section 411.182, the
Kentucky General Assembly intended to abrogate joint and several
liability, thereby obviating the need for contribution, Civil Rule 14 needs
to be reworded in order to accommodate that policy.
C. Unreachable, Unnamed, and Insolvent Tortfeasors
In enacting KRS section 411.182, the General Assembly did not
explicitly address who would bear the liability of an absent tortfeasor who
was not named as a party to the action. These "phantom tortfeasors"
include unreachable tortfeasors, such as a hit and run driver; unnamed
tortfeasors, such as a friend or relative of the plaintiff; or insolvent
tortfeasors, who may or may not have been named as a party to the
action, but are nonetheless unable to pay for their share of liability. The
issue that then arises is what should happen to the "phantom defendant's"
share of liability. Should the plaintiff, the defendant, or both bear the
burden of paying a phantom's share of the damages?
Most states that have retained joint and several liability continue to
place the burden of paying a phantom's share of damages on the
defendant. The rationale is that the defendant's conduct was more
egregious than the plaintiffs because the defendant jeopardized the safety
of others, whereas the plaintiff was negligent only by failing to provide
for his own safety. 5 This same rationale is used by other jurisdictions
that have purported to abandoned joint and several liability, but neverthe-
less continue to hold the defendant jointly liable for the liability of
phantom defendants. 56 The more aggressive states, which have aban-
," See, e.g., American Motorcycle Assoc. v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 903-06
(Cal. 1978) (holding that the state would retain joint and several liability even though it
had previously implemented comparative negligence, based partly on the theory that a
plaintiffs culpability is not on a level with the defendant's because the plaintiff s failure
was in protecting himself, not others) (superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 143)
(West 1994)).
26 See UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1993) (partially abandoning joint and
several liability by providing that each tortfeasor is liable only for the proportionate
amount of damages caused by his negligence as compared to the proportionate amount
of damages caused by the negligence of each other sued tortfeasor).
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doned joint and several liability completely, apportion fault to all
tortfeasors whether or not they were joined as parties. These states apply
the rationale that a party's liability should be limited to his percentage of
fault 7 Under the latter approach, the plaintiff bears the same risk that
exists every time a party is injured through someone else's negli-
gence-that the negligent party will be unknown, insolvent, or someone
that the plaintiff would rather not sue.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act retains joint and several liability,
making the defendant responsible for the liability of phantoms.25 In the
case of an insolvent party who is held liable, however, the Act allocates
the insolvent defendant's liability among all solvent parties, including the
plaintiff, according to the percentage of fault that the jury assigned to
each The Kentucky statute does not expressly address this issue, and
the Kentucky Supreme Court has not had the issue directly before it.
Despite the lack of clear guidance on this issue in Kentucky, a close
reading of the statute, the case law, and the common policies behind
each, indicates that Kentucky law is headed in the direction of a full-scale
apportionment regime in which fault is apportioned in all situations,
including those involving phantom defendants. The aforementioned
position is most consistent with the pure comparative fault system that the
supreme court adopted in Hilen v. Hays6 and with the principles
asserted by its line of apportionment decisions.26'
In the case of a known, unnamed tortfeasor, the problem is solved
(ignoring the Kevin Tucker & Assocs. rule) by allowing the defendant to
assert a third-party claim against the unnamed party and then apportion-
ing liability between himself and the third-party defendant. If the
defendant for some reason neglects to join the unnamed tortfeasor, the
result will depend upon the construction given to the statute. KRS section
411.182(1)(b) reads as follows:
'" See Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Kan.
1981) (holding that under comparative fault principles, the fault of all parties to an
accident must be considered when determining liability).
z58 UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT AcT §§ 1-10, 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
,,9 UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT AT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1981).
673 S.W.2d 713, 719-20 (Ky. 1984) (adopting comparative negligence on the
theory that liability should be limited to the extent of a party's fault).
"5 See Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988) (stating that
damages in tort actions in Kentucky are no longer joint and several but several only);
Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky. 1990) (stating that a party is liable for an
amount equal to his degree of fault, no more and no less); Dix & Assocs. Pipeline
Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990) (approving apportionment to a
third-party defendant employer).
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL[
(1) in all tort actions ... involving fault of more than one party to
the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been
released under subsection (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise
agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer interrogatories ...
indicating:
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each
claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party
defendant, and person who has been released from liability under
subsection (4) of this section. 262
The correct interpretation of the statute depends upon the method of
allocating fault. If liability really is limited to each party's amount of
fault, then the defendant would have to be allowed to bring in evidence
of an unnamed tortfeasor's conduct in order to prove the true extent of the
defendant's fault. In other words, the court would have to allow appor-
tionment to absent parties. The statute provides that in determining
percentages of fault, the fact-finder should consider the nature of each
party's conduct and "the extent of the causal relation between the conduct
and the damages claimed." ' 3 However, the statute does not mention
whether fault of other parties should also be considered.
If nonparties, parties who are unnamed for one of the three reasons
mentioned above, are ignored, then the absent party's fault is essentially
being redistributed among parties to the action to whom fault is appor-
tioned, including the plaintiff. In this situation, each party's liability is not
"limited by the extent of his fault"2" because each is to be charged
with the unnamed party's share of liability in accordance with the
percentages of liability as determined by the jury.
In contrast to KRS section 411.182, the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act places the burden of the unnamed party's liability on the defendant
by retaining joint and several liability265 with the possibility of contri-
bution.2" The Act provides for allocation of fault to parties for the
purpose of contribution.2" It is reasonable to infer that by intentionally
omitting the sections on joint and several liability and contribution from
KRS section 411.182, the Kentucky General Assembly intended to
262 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)(b) (Baldwin 1993).
23 Id. § 411.182(2).
26 Floyd, 758 S.W.2d at 432.
UNIF. COMPARATVE FAULT Acr § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1981).
UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1981).
2 UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(c), 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
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completely abrogate the two doctrines, adopting the policy that no party
should be liable for more than the percentage of damages caused by his
own fault. Under such a construction, the plaintiff bears the burden of not
naming a negligent party, because his recovery will be reduced by the
nonparty's percentage of fault.
Although they were not technically applying the statute, the decisions
of the Kentucky Supreme Court after the enactment of KRS section
411.182 seem to support the apportionment of fault to unnamed parties.
In Stratton v. Parker,"6 the jury apportioned seventy-five percent of the
fault to the injured plaintiff, twenty-five percent to the defendant, and
zero percent to the settling tortfeasor.269 The trial court allowed the
defendant a credit for the amount paid by the settling tortfeasor.27° The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, and Justice Vance's majority opinion
discussed the current state of Kentucky's apportionment law: "The
appellee is liable for an amount equal to his degree of fault, no more, and
no less.""27 Later that year, Justice Vance made a similar statement in
Dix22:
The principles announced in Hilen v. Hays, supra, which established
comparative negligence in Kentucky, and cases which followed it,
including Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Moody, supra; Floyd v.
Carlisle Construction Co., Ina, supra; and Stratton v. Parker, supra;
have established that liability among joint tort-feasors in negligence
cases is no longer joint and several but is several only .... Our
decision in Hilen v. Hays, was premised upon the principle of funda-
mental fairness, that liability should be... determined by the exteri of
the fault. .. .Whereas it is fundamentally unfair for a plaintiff who is
only 5 percent at fault to be absolutely barred from recovery from a
defendant who is 95 percent at fault, it is equally and fundamentally
unfair to require one joint tortfeasor who is only 5 percent at fault to
bear the entire loss when another tortfeasor has caused 95 percent of the
loss 73
Although Justice Vance's opinions in both Stratton and Dix addressed
apportionment to parties against whom the plaintiff had actively asserted
- 793 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1990).
2 Id. at 818.
= Id.
27 Id. at 820.
Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1990).
r Id. at 27.
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a claim,274 the reasoning behind his comments also supports apportion-
ment of liability to phantom parties. The court has already approved
apportionment to settling parties275 and to parties who have been
dismissed from trial*7  In both of these situations, the party to whom
fault is being apportioned is not present at trial and, at least in the
situation involving a party who has been dismissed for some reason other
than an agreement with the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be able to
recover from him.
For example, in Prudential Life2 the court approved apportion-
ment to a defendant who had been dismissed from trial because of the
running of the statute of limitations and upheld a judgment imposing
liability on the remaining defendant only to the extent of his fault.27
The court's holding could be based on the premise that it would be
inequitable to hold a defendant liable for the entire injury when he only
caused a fraction of it.279 This situation is arguably indistinguishable
from a situation where the plaintiff did not bring a claim against the
released defendant at all. It is no more equitable to hold a defendant
liable for the entire injury in the latter case than in the former.
The plaintiff can minimize the corresponding reduction in his
recovery by naming all negligent parties against whom he can possibly
recover, including friends and relatives. If the plaintiff chooses not to join
274 Id. at 29 (considering a workers' compensation settlement to be an active assertion
of a claim); Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1990) (apportioning liability
to settling tortfeasor who had at one time had a claim asserted against him).
275 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Ky. 1970) ("[The jury should be
required to assess the total amount of the claimant's damages and fix the proportionate
share of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability on the basis of his contribution to the
causation."); Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988) ('A
tortfeasor who is not actually a defendant is construed to be one for the purposes of
apportionment if he has settled the claim against him....").
' See Daulton v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1976) ("The principle of Orr v.
Coleman applies when there has been an active assertion of a claim against one who
would be a defendant but for the fact that he has settled the claim. The same rationale
applies ... [where] the claim by the Reeds [plaintiff] against the Phillips [defendant] was
later dropped .. ") (citations omitted)); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d
503, 504 (Ky. 1985) ("The [c]ourt of [a]ppeals reasoned that apportionment is permitted
only against 'defendants'. . . and concluded since we held that Carney [defendant] should
have been dismissed ... he could not have been considered a 'defendant' ... for the
purpose of the apportionment statute. We are of the opinion the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals is in
error in this respect.").
27 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985). See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
27s Id. at 504.
27 Id. at 504 (Vance, J., concurring) ("I concur with the majority opinion. I do so
because it fairly apportions liability according to the percentage of fault.").
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certain tortfeasors as defendants, the named defendants should not suffer
the consequences of that choice. While extension of apportionment to
known, unnamed parties would in no way discourage settlement, it might
increase litigation by encouraging plaintiffs to bring claims they would
not otherwise have asserted.280 But, as Justice Leibson asserted in
writing for a unanimous Court in Hilen v. Hays, "[t]o those who speculate
that comparative negligence will cost more money or cause more
litigation, we say there are no good economies in an unjust law."'
The principles behind the Kentucky Supreme Court's approval of
apportionment to settling partiesn and employers283 should be ex-
tended to allow apportionment of fault to parties who enjoy interspousal
or similar immunity because, as is the case of an employer, the immunity
exists independent of the defendant's liability. The immunity in each
situation exists for a valid reason, and the plaintiff receives a windfall if
he is allowed to recover in full from the remaining defendant who was
only partly at fault.' The only way to be consistent with comparative
negligence principles is to determine a party's percentage of fault by
comparing that party's percentage to all of the other parties who
contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they were or could have
been joined as defendants. 5 In this manner, liability is to be deter-
mined on the basis of the percentage of fault of each participant to the
o KEErON Er AL., supra note 8, at 475.
22 Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984).
2 Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Ky. 1970) (stating that the objective that
liability should be apportioned between tortfeasors based on culpability is not achieved
if "the amount of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability is made to depend on the amount
for which the other has settled.").
2 Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors Inc., 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990)
("[W]orkers' compensation coverage constitutes a settlement between the employee and
the employer .... For all practical purposes, in this case, Dix & Associates occupies the
position of a tortfeasor which has settled the tort claim against it.").
2 4 In abrogating joint and several liability in Kansas, the Kansas Supreme Court in
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978), stated.
Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault
happens to be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some
competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment for his injuries
from the spouse or agency, there is no compelling social policy which requires
the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss.
"2 See, e.g., Fabre v. Martin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 1993) (interpreting a
Florida statute to mandate that in determining the liability of a defendant whose fault was
less than or equal to the plaintiff's, the fault of all other tortfeasors, named or not, must
be considered).
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accident and not on the basis of solvency or amenability to suit of other
potential defendants. 8
Other states have reached the same result2 7 For example, in
Kansas, the fault of phantoms is compared with that of other tortfeasors
in order to reduce each party's liability to the extent of damages caused
by his fault. In Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselschaf,2' the
Kansas Supreme Court stated that in order to be consistent with
comparative fault principles, "all parties to an occurrence must have their
fault determined in one action, even though some parties cannot be
formally joined!"2 9 because they are outside the jurisdiction, uncollect-
ible, etc., or cannot be held legally responsible because they are immune
from suit for some reason, and that "those not joined as parties ...
escape liability." '  Albertson was a reaffirmance of earlier Kansas
decisions approving apportionment of fault to employers who are immune
because of workers' compensation 29' and to negligent parties who enjoy
interspousal immunity.292 The arguments advanced by the Kansas
Supreme Court in support of this result closely match the reasoning of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in its apportionment decisions.
" Id. at 1186.
2" See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B) (Supp. 1993) ("In assessing
percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed
to the alleged injury... regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named
as a party to the suit.'); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(3)(a) (1987) ("[T]he finder of
fact... may consider the degree or percentage of negligence of fault of a person not a
party to the action. . . "); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579,
586 (N.M. Ct. App.) (quoting from HEFr & HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLiGENCE MANUAL
§ 8.131 (1978), and stating that all tortfeasors should be included in the apportionment
question), cert. denied, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour,
623 P.2d 1174, 1191 (Wyo. 1981) ("We conclude that in a comparative negligence case
the jury must consider the negligence of not only the parties but all the participants in the
transaction which produced the injuries sued upon.").
a 634 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1981).
n9 Id. at 1133.
2W Id.
2" See Scales v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co., 582 P.2d 300, 307 (Kan. Ct. App.
1978) (approving apportionment of fault to an immune employer).
' See Miles v. West, 580 P.2d 876, 880 (Kan. 1978). Husband driver enjoyed
immunity from suit by his passengers, wife and child. In an action by the wife and child
against the driver of the other vehicle, the trial court ordered a reduction of an award
rendered against the other driver by the amount of the husband's negligence. Id. at 879.
The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 882. See also Brown
v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 876 (Kan. 1978) (approving apportionment to nonparty who was
the plaintiff's son).
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In Bass v. Williams,293 however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
refused to apply KRS section 411.182 in order to reach a result similar
to that of the Kansas court. In Bass, the plaintiff was a passenger in the
car in which her husband was driving when he was involved in an
accident.' The plaintiff brought a claim against the driver of the other
car, who requested that the court apportion liability to the negligent
husband even though the husband was not sued.95 The trial court
granted the defendant's request, and the plaintiff appealed." s The court
of appeals described the situation as "just one more stump to plow around
in the field of comparative fault." 7
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failure to name the tortfeasor
should be classified under KRS section 411.182(4) as "a covenant not to
sue, or 'similar agreement entered in by a claimant and a person
liable."'" 8 The court nevertheless rejected the defendant's argument and
concluded that fault and damages may not be apportioned to one who
does not fall specifically within the scope of the statute, which includes
only named parties and those who have "bought their peace from the
litigation by way of releases or agreements." 9
Part of the court of appeals' reluctance to apportion fault to the
husband in Bass stemmed from its fear that if it accepted the defendant's
argument, "conceivably the courtroom could have many empty chairs
belonging to tortfeasors unnamed, and possibly unknown until trial."3'
However, the court's reluctance to open the floodgates to apportioning
fault to "empty chairs" is directly contradicted by their decision in Kevin
Tucker & Assocs."1 just a few months later. In Kevin Tucker & Assocs.,
the court actually encouraged apportionment to "empty chairs" by inviting
defendants to bring third-party claims, even though such claims would
routinely be dropped.3"
The above analysis changes slightly when the absent party is not a
known, unnamed party, but an unknown or unreachable party. In the case
of a known, negligent party, the plaintiff has the option of joining the
m 839 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
2  Id. at 560.
29 Id. at 563.
Z"Id.
2 Id.
2" Id. at 564 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(4) (Baldwin 1993)).
" Id.
30 Id.
30M 842 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
'02 Id. at 874 n.5.
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party to the original action. Thus, the plaintiff can avoid being under-
compensated by simply joining or reaching a favorable settlement with
the party. Conversely, in the case of an unknown party, such as a hit and
run driver, or an unreachable party, such as a tortfeasor who is outside
the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff has no way to recover from the absent
parties. If the plaintiff s award is reduced by the absent party's amount of
fault, the plaintiff in this situation is undercompensated.
Although reducing an injured plaintiffs recovery by the amount of
fault of a party who is unknown or completely unreachable appears harsh,
a closer look reveals that the reduction is not as inequitable as it first
seems. The possibility that a defendant will be insolvent or unreachable
is a risk that a plaintiff faces every time he brings a claim.3 Further-
more, the instances in which a potential defendant is unknown or
completely unreachable would presumably be relatively rare. States that
have abandoned joint liability in favor of several liability have predomi-
nantly allowed apportionment across the board, meaning that the plaintiff
bears the loss in the case of an unknown or unreachable defendant"5
just as he does if the unreachable or unknown defendant is the only
tortfeasor.
The analysis is similar in cases involving insolvent tortfeasors.
Insolvent tortfeasors who are not named are the equivalent of unknown
or unreachable parties. In dealing with named defendants who turn out to
be insolvent, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted KRS section
411.182 while omitting section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act. Section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides for the
redistribution of amounts uncollectible from a particular negligent party
among the other parties, including the plaintiff, in accordance with the
respective percentages of fault."5 Section 2(d) also expressly provides
that the party whose liability is reallocated is subject to a contribution
"' See, e.g., Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 205 (Fla. 1987)
(McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the plaintiff bears the risk "of the defendant
being insolvent" in both the single and multiple defendant situations).
"' "It is accepted practice to include all tortfeasors in the apportionment question.
This includes nonparties who may be unknown tortfeasors, phantom drivers, and persons
alleged to be negligent, but not liable in damages to the injured party .... " Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 586 (N.M. Ct. App.) (quoting HEFT &
HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 8.131 (1978)), cert. denied, 648 P.2d 794
(N.M. 1982). The Bartlett Court held that because New Mexico was a pure comparative
negligence state, a defendant should not be held liable for the negligence of an unknown
driver who contributed to an accident. Id. at 586.
10s UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT Acr § 2(d), 12 U.LA. 33 (Supp. 1981).
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claim against him."'6 Although the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
approach seems fair and consistent with comparative fault principles, the
General Assembly's intentional omission of this section, together with the
omission of a provision for contribution, points to the conclusion that the
loss of an uncollectible amount is to be borne by the plaintiff. This
conclusion is also consistent with the Kentucky Supreme Court's constant
assertion that liability for any particular injury should be in direct
proportion to fault."7
By its intentional omission of a joint and several liability provision
in KRS section 411.182, the Kentucky General Assembly expressed a
desire to abandon joint and several liability. Similarly, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has stated in its recent opinions that "liability among joint
tort-feasors in negligence cases is no longer joint and several but is
several only."3 The next logical step is to extend apportionment of
fault to all tortfeasors, regardless of whether they are named as parties to
the action. This step seems to be what a majority of the Kentucky
Supreme Court has been leading up to and is the only way to maintain
consistency in a fault-based system which "calls for liability for any
particular injury in direct proportion to fault."3 9
CONCLUSION
The law in Kentucky regarding apportionment of liability to multiple
tortfeasors is far from settled. The move from the long-standing doctrine
of contributory negligence to a comparative fault regime, and all that such
a regime entails, is a sweeping change in the law and was certain to be
infested with implementational difficulties. Abandonment of the doctrine
of joint and several liability in favor of apportionment of fault among
3
06 Id.
31 See, e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984) (adopting comparative
negligence) (discussed supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text); Prudential Life Ins. Co.
v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1985) (allowing a defendant dismissed from the
action to still have fault apportioned against him) (discussed supra notes 106-26 and
accompanying text); Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1988)
(stating that damages in tort actions in Kentucky are no longer joint and several, but
several only) (discussed supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text); Stratton v. Parker,
793 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky. 1990) (stating that a party is liable for an amount equal to his
degree of fault, no more and no less) (discussed supra notes 268-71 and accompanying
text); Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1990)
(approving apportionment to a third-party defendant employer).
30 Dbx, 799 S.W.2d at 27.
3o9 Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 718.
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joint tortfeasors was one of the many changes necessary to consistently
implement a comprehensive comparative fault system. The Kentucky courts
and General Assembly have aggressively attacked the inherent problems.
Although the battle is not over, Kentucky's comparative fault system is
rapidly developing into a more equitable system of assigning liability in tort
actions according to fault, rather than according to fictitious assumptions.
The enactment of KRS section 411.182 and the Kentucky decisions
following its enactment lead to the conclusion that joint and several liability
no longer exists, at least in most situations. However, the applicability of the
statute is more evident in some situations than it is in others. Fault clearly can
be apportioned to parties who are present at trial,10 to settling tort-
feasors, to tortfeasors who were named and later dismissed from the
action,312 and to third-party defendants. 13 In addition, after Dix, it is
almost certain that the Kentucky Supreme Court would allow apportionment
to negligent employers who "settle" an employee's claim against them by
paying workers' compensation.3?1 4 In all of these situations, the party to
whom fault is apportioned is either available at trial for potential recovery by
the plaintiff or is immune from liability because the plaintiff has already
partially recovered from him.
The more questionable cases are situations involving unreachable,
unknown, unnamed, or insolvent parties from whom the plaintiff has no
chance of recovering. KRS section 411.182 does not directly address such
"nonparties," but the General Assembly's intentional omission of a provision
for joint and several liability and contribution indicates a desire to abandon
the doctrines altogether by apportioning fault to all tortfeasors, regardless of
whether they were named as parties to the action.315
The best way to apportion fault across the board, while maximizing
efficiency and fairness to all parties involved, is, first, to allow apportionment
of fault to all immune parties, including employers, spouses, and others,
without requiring them to be brought into the action. These arrangements
could fit under KRS section 411.182(4) as a release "or similar agreement."
Second, the third-party rule should be amended to allow third-party
claims to be brought against those who are, or may be, liable to the plaintiff
for all, or part, of his claim. This amendment would allow defendants to
30 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)(b) (Baldwin 1993).
311 Orr V. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
312 Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1985).
313 Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d at 24, 29 (Ky. 1990).
314 See id. at 29 (analogizing workers' compensation to a settled claim). See supra
notes 225-28.
315 See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
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assert actions against negligent joint tortfeasors whom the plaintiff was
reluctant to sue. Amending the third-party rule would prevent the plaintiff
from picking and choosing defendants and would eliminate the undesir-
able result reached by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Kevin Tucker &
Assocs? 6
If liability is apportioned across the board, pursuant to the above
scheme, the plaintiff's chances for recovery will be maximized, and each
defendant's liability will truly be limited to his equitable share of fault.
The only situations in which the plaintiff would be undercompensated
would be those in which there is an unreachable, unknown, or insolvent
defendant. The fist two situations are relatively rare. As for the third
situation, the risk of an unreachable or insolvent defendant is a risk that
every plaintiff who files a tort action faces. The situation should not
change merely because multiple tortfeasors are involved.
Kentucky is well on its way to implementing a full-scale comparative
fault system in which no party is held liable for more than the damages
caused by his fault."7 Such a system is inherently fair and logical, but
the long detour taken by this country in developing a set of rules based
on contributory negligence has made courts and legislatures reluctant to
change. Kentucky has aggressively taken the most important steps toward
accomplishing a completely new tort system based on comparative fault.
Now that Kentucky has traveled this far into the new system, it should
take the final step by expressly declaring a rule that fault will be
apportioned to all tortfeasors, regardless of whether they were named
parties to the action.
Julie O'Daniel McClellan
316 See supra notes 229-52 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 69-309 and accompanying text.
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